President of Syria (military rule)
In office
11 July 1953 – 25 February 1954
Preceded by Fawzi Selu (military rule)
Succeeded by Hashim al-Atassi
Prime Minister of Syria
In office
19 July 1953 – 1 March 1954
Preceded by Fawzi Selu
Succeeded by Sabri al-Assali
Personal details
Born 1909
Hama, Syria
Died 27 September 1964 (aged 55)
Ceres, Brazil
Political party Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Arab Liberation Movement
Spouse(s) Fatina al-Fanari
In office
11 July 1953 – 25 February 1954
Preceded by Fawzi Selu (military rule)
Succeeded by Hashim al-Atassi
Prime Minister of Syria
In office
19 July 1953 – 1 March 1954
Preceded by Fawzi Selu
Succeeded by Sabri al-Assali
Personal details
Born 1909
Hama, Syria
Died 27 September 1964 (aged 55)
Ceres, Brazil
Political party Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Arab Liberation Movement
Spouse(s) Fatina al-Fanari
Adib Bin Hassan Al-Shishakli (Arabic:, 1909 - 27 September 1964) was a Syrian military leader and President of Syria (1953–54).
Early Life
Adib Shishakli was Kurdish Syrian, born in the Hama region in 1909.His family name, Shishakli, is a common Turkish surname, and written as "Çiçekli" in Turkish. "Çiçek" means flower in Turkish, and Çiçekli (Shishakli) means someone or some place with flowers. Alternative Latin transliterations from the Arabic are Chichakly, Chichakli and Jijakli.
Adib Shishakli was Kurdish Syrian, born in the Hama region in 1909.His family name, Shishakli, is a common Turkish surname, and written as "Çiçekli" in Turkish. "Çiçek" means flower in Turkish, and Çiçekli (Shishakli) means someone or some place with flowers. Alternative Latin transliterations from the Arabic are Chichakly, Chichakli and Jijakli.
Political/military career
Shishakli was commissioned as an officer in the French Syrian Army in 1930, during the mandate era. He studied at the Military Academy of Damascus (which later was relocated to Homs) and became an early member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) of Antun Saadeh, promoting the concept of a Greater Syria. His brother Salah was also a prominent member of the SSNP. After independence, Shishakli fought in a volunteer Arab army, known as the Arab Liberation Army, in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
The Arab defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a motivating factor for the military coup led by Husni al-Za'im, which took place in 1949. Only months after al-Za'im's takeover, which shattered Syria's weak parliamentary system, al-Za'im was overthrown by a group of officers connected to the SSNP, including Shishakli and Zaim's old comrade, Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led the new military junta.
Za'im had previously delivered the SSNP leader Antun Saadeh to the Lebanese authorities, who had him tried and executed for wanting to destroy the modern state of Lebanon. Reportedly, after Za'im was killed, Shishakli ripped off Za'im's bloodstained shirt and took it to Saadeh's widow, who was still in Syria, telling her, "We have avenged his murder!"[citation needed].
Shishakli worked with Sami al-Hinnawi, the new de facto ruler of Syria who refused to assume power on his own and who, instead, restored Syria's parliamentary system. Hinnawi became chief-of-staff of the Syrian Army. A veteran nationalist, Hashem al-Atassi, who had been president in the 1930s, became prime minister, and then president of Syria. Atassi wanted to create a union with Hashemite Iraq, something which Shishakli greatly opposed, claiming that Hinnawi was the driver behind pro-Hashemite sentiment in Syria.
The Arab defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a motivating factor for the military coup led by Husni al-Za'im, which took place in 1949. Only months after al-Za'im's takeover, which shattered Syria's weak parliamentary system, al-Za'im was overthrown by a group of officers connected to the SSNP, including Shishakli and Zaim's old comrade, Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led the new military junta.
Za'im had previously delivered the SSNP leader Antun Saadeh to the Lebanese authorities, who had him tried and executed for wanting to destroy the modern state of Lebanon. Reportedly, after Za'im was killed, Shishakli ripped off Za'im's bloodstained shirt and took it to Saadeh's widow, who was still in Syria, telling her, "We have avenged his murder!"[citation needed].
Shishakli worked with Sami al-Hinnawi, the new de facto ruler of Syria who refused to assume power on his own and who, instead, restored Syria's parliamentary system. Hinnawi became chief-of-staff of the Syrian Army. A veteran nationalist, Hashem al-Atassi, who had been president in the 1930s, became prime minister, and then president of Syria. Atassi wanted to create a union with Hashemite Iraq, something which Shishakli greatly opposed, claiming that Hinnawi was the driver behind pro-Hashemite sentiment in Syria.
Seizing power
In December 1949, Shishakli launched another coup, the third of that year, arresting Hinnawi to break Hashemite influence in Syria, but keeping Atassi at his post. He then ordered the assassination of Colonel Mohammad Nasser, the Air Force Commander, because he threatened Shishakli's popularity in the Syrian Army. All of this greatly weakened the pro-union elements in Syria but they continued to work for union with Hashemite Iraq through the Prime Minister, Nazim al-Kudsi.
Shishakli set the condition that any government had to include his right-hand-man, Fawzi Selu, as Minister for Defence, to curb Hashemite influence in the Syrian government. When Prime Minister Maarouf al-Dawalibi, a pro-Iraq politician from Aleppo, refused this demand, Shishakli responded on 28 November 1951 by arresting Dawalibi and his entire cabinet. He also had arrested all pro-Iraq politicians in Syria, including the leaders of the People's Party, Nazim al-Kudsi and Rushdi al-Kikhya. In protest, Atassi resigned from office and moved into the opposition. Pleased to get rid of this stubborn nationalist, who rejected military intervention in political affairs, Shishakli made his comrade Selu the Chief-of-Staff of the Army, the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, and the Head of State. But in effect, Selu was nothing but a figurehead. The real power lay in the hands of Adib al-Shishakli.
Shishakli set the condition that any government had to include his right-hand-man, Fawzi Selu, as Minister for Defence, to curb Hashemite influence in the Syrian government. When Prime Minister Maarouf al-Dawalibi, a pro-Iraq politician from Aleppo, refused this demand, Shishakli responded on 28 November 1951 by arresting Dawalibi and his entire cabinet. He also had arrested all pro-Iraq politicians in Syria, including the leaders of the People's Party, Nazim al-Kudsi and Rushdi al-Kikhya. In protest, Atassi resigned from office and moved into the opposition. Pleased to get rid of this stubborn nationalist, who rejected military intervention in political affairs, Shishakli made his comrade Selu the Chief-of-Staff of the Army, the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, and the Head of State. But in effect, Selu was nothing but a figurehead. The real power lay in the hands of Adib al-Shishakli.
Shishakli in power
Shishakli then dissolved all political parties in a return to military rule. He banned a number of newspapers and outlawed all newspapers that were not pro-Shishakli. Among those to suffer persecution under his rule were the National Party of Damascus, the People's Party of Aleppo, the Communist Party, the Baath Party, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. He banished the Baath leaders Akram al-Hawrani, Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Bitar to Lebanon, where they then actively worked against his regime.
He was a skilled public speaker and relied greatly on radio to transmit his speeches to the Syrian population. In August 1952, he established an official government party, the Arab Liberation Movement, but it was boycotted by powerful representatives of civilian political society, such as Hashim al-Atassi. The party was progressive and accepted women within its ranks. It called for a limited degree of socialism. Some said that he viewed himself as "an Arab Caesar." In mid-1953 Shishakli staged an election to make himself President, but he was by now facing mounting dissent.
He was a skilled public speaker and relied greatly on radio to transmit his speeches to the Syrian population. In August 1952, he established an official government party, the Arab Liberation Movement, but it was boycotted by powerful representatives of civilian political society, such as Hashim al-Atassi. The party was progressive and accepted women within its ranks. It called for a limited degree of socialism. Some said that he viewed himself as "an Arab Caesar." In mid-1953 Shishakli staged an election to make himself President, but he was by now facing mounting dissent.
Foreign relations
As leader of Syria, Shishakli sought good relations with Western countries, but maintained Syria's uncompromising stance towards Israel. Syrian relations with the Hashemite monarchies of Jordan and Iraq were poor during his presidency, but he also mistrusted the rapid spread of Nasserism. Many believe that Nasser's Free Officer Revolution of 1952 in Egypt had been modeled after Shishakli's own coups of 1949 and 1951. Shishakli's developed strong relations with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, his son, King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and King Talal of Jordan.
Shishakli greatly liked King Talal who said that he had no ambitions in Syria, unlike his father King Abdullah I[citation needed]. Despite his pro-Western outlook and family background, Shishakli recognized the desires of Syria's Arab majority and accordingly adopted a policy of pan-Arabism. He clashed frequently with the independent-minded Druze minority on the Jabal Druze mountain, accusing them of wanting to topple his regime using funds from Jordan. In 1954, he resorted to shelling Druze strongholds to put down resistance to his rule.
His relations with both Britain and the United States were mixed. Britain courted Shishakli during the early period of his rule in the hope that Syria would join plans for a British-led Middle East Defence Organization. The United States offered Shishakli considerable sums of money to settle Palestinian refugees in Syria and turn them into Syrians. Shishakli, although tempted by these offers of Western arms and money, did not take them. The Palestinian situation had soured the Syrian view of the West. Syria wanted revenge rather than to accept defeat and repair Syria's damaged relations with the West and make peace with Israel.[2]
Shishakli greatly liked King Talal who said that he had no ambitions in Syria, unlike his father King Abdullah I[citation needed]. Despite his pro-Western outlook and family background, Shishakli recognized the desires of Syria's Arab majority and accordingly adopted a policy of pan-Arabism. He clashed frequently with the independent-minded Druze minority on the Jabal Druze mountain, accusing them of wanting to topple his regime using funds from Jordan. In 1954, he resorted to shelling Druze strongholds to put down resistance to his rule.
His relations with both Britain and the United States were mixed. Britain courted Shishakli during the early period of his rule in the hope that Syria would join plans for a British-led Middle East Defence Organization. The United States offered Shishakli considerable sums of money to settle Palestinian refugees in Syria and turn them into Syrians. Shishakli, although tempted by these offers of Western arms and money, did not take them. The Palestinian situation had soured the Syrian view of the West. Syria wanted revenge rather than to accept defeat and repair Syria's damaged relations with the West and make peace with Israel.[2]
Downfall
Main article: 1954 Syrian coup d'état
Shishakli also had arrested a lot of active officers in the Syrian Army, including the young Adnan al-Malki, a prominent Baathist. The largest anti-Shishakli conference had been held in Atassi's home in Homs. Leading the anti-Shishakli movement were former President Atassi and the veteran Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash. Shishakli had responded by arresting Atassi and Atrash's sons, Adnan and Mansur (both of whom were ranking politicians in Syria).
Growing discontent eventually led to another coup, in which Shishakli was overthrown in February 1954. The plotters included members of the Syrian Communist Party, Druze officers, and Ba'ath Party members. It may have had Iraqi backing.
When the insurgency reached its peak, Shishakli backed down, refusing to drag Syria into civil war. He fled to Lebanon, but when the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat threatened to have him killed, he fled to Brazil. Prior to the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, Shishakli toyed with the idea of returning to Syria to launch a coup d'état, using funds provided by Iraq. The coup was foiled by Syrian intelligence and Shishakli was sentenced to death in absentia.
On 27 September 1964, Shishakli was assassinated at Ceres, Brazil by Nawaf Ghazaleh, a Syrian Druze who sought revenge for his parents who had died leaving him an orphan during the bombardment of Jabal Druze.
Adib Shishakly is his grandson and an active member
of the Syrian Opposition.
wikipedia
Shishakli also had arrested a lot of active officers in the Syrian Army, including the young Adnan al-Malki, a prominent Baathist. The largest anti-Shishakli conference had been held in Atassi's home in Homs. Leading the anti-Shishakli movement were former President Atassi and the veteran Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash. Shishakli had responded by arresting Atassi and Atrash's sons, Adnan and Mansur (both of whom were ranking politicians in Syria).
Growing discontent eventually led to another coup, in which Shishakli was overthrown in February 1954. The plotters included members of the Syrian Communist Party, Druze officers, and Ba'ath Party members. It may have had Iraqi backing.
When the insurgency reached its peak, Shishakli backed down, refusing to drag Syria into civil war. He fled to Lebanon, but when the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat threatened to have him killed, he fled to Brazil. Prior to the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, Shishakli toyed with the idea of returning to Syria to launch a coup d'état, using funds provided by Iraq. The coup was foiled by Syrian intelligence and Shishakli was sentenced to death in absentia.
On 27 September 1964, Shishakli was assassinated at Ceres, Brazil by Nawaf Ghazaleh, a Syrian Druze who sought revenge for his parents who had died leaving him an orphan during the bombardment of Jabal Druze.
Adib Shishakly is his grandson and an active member
of the Syrian Opposition.
wikipedia
“Remember Syria’s Adib Shishakli,” by Christopher Solomon.2016
Nearly 52 years ago, a Syrian political leader hiding in exile was killed in the heart of Brazil. As Syria watchers continue to monitor and understand the country’s grinding civil war, the era of the former Syrian political figure Adib Al-Shishakli could yield some clues.
The flag of the Syrian opposition factions bares the green, white, and black tricolor with three red stars. The very same flag once flew over Syria from its independence until the late 1950’s, a turbulent era marked by political intrigue, military coups, early experiments with democracy, and authoritarian rule. At the center of this era was a powerful political figure now barely remembered both outside of Syria, Adib Al-Shishakli.
As policy makers in capitals across the Western World grapple with Syria’s endless violence, Shishakli’s legacy and the lessons from his time are worth remembering today. Shishakli’s rule over Syria, geopolitical trends, his relationship with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), and his ensuing ouster yield some clues on what we might expect as the civil war prepares to enter its sixth year.
Coups, Stability, and Authoritarian Rule
Hailing from Hama, Shishakli was a Syrian Kurd who served in the Arab armies that took part in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. His exploits on the front lines earned him a following among Syria’s officer corps. Though Shishakli was not known to be an ideologically driven figure, he entertained many of the nascent political activists at the officer’s club in Damascus. Shishakli was largely known for his close association with Antoun Saadeh’s SSNP, also sometimes referred to as the Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS). In addition, his participation in nationalist inspired actions against the French, such as the take over and occupation of the Hama citadel in 1944, only added to his reputation as a man of action.
Syria’s politically turbulent years in the wake of independence saw the reigns of leadership held by prominent nationalist personalities, such as Shukri Quwatli, and subsequent power squabbles between his National Bloc and the pro-Iraqi Aleppo-based People’s Party, with plenty of political intrigue from the SSNP and its primary competitor, the student dominated Baath movement. The country was soon rocked by a series of coups that turned the country into a pariah state.
Shishakli came to power in 1950 with the third military coup which brought about a short period of stability. Shishakli had aided General Husni Ziam in Syria’s first coup by leading an army division. However, it was Shishakli’s rule which marked the first time the military would fully enter political life in an Arab country, establishing a trend that would acquaint regional armies with the taste of high office.
For some, the period of military rule had benefits. The Shishakli regime cracked down on crime, enforced strict control of Syria’s porous borders, and work to build the army into a modern force. Shishakli also harnessed the power of the radio and was well known throughout the region even before Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser for his oratory and zeal that reverberated through the airwaves. He was the first post-independence Arab leader to cultivate a cult of personality with his pictures appearing in every shop window and established a government ministry of information and propaganda.
His spies and security agents were posted throughout the country to monitor any potential anti-Shishakli activity. All political parties were banned, especially religious parties. Long before Egypt’s deadly cat and mouse game with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Shishakli barred the Islamic Socialist Front (Syria’s early incarnation of the MB) from participation in politics. Maarouf al-Dawalibi of the MB, was close to the Aleppo’s People Party and was removed as the Minister of Economy after Shishakli’s coup.
Upon returning from Egypt, Shishakli was greeted at the airport by the pro-Baath army officer, Adnan al-Malki with demands for political reform. Shishakli had Malki compile a list of everyone involved in the confrontation and threw them in prison.
Despite the crackdown, there are those who recall Shishakli’s era, or have studied it, that speak fondly of him, remembering the avant garde laws that were enacted during his time. The Damascus International Fair of 1954 was one of Shishakli’s development projects to raise the country’s international profile, along with the Port of Latakia. The first woman to run for office was schoolteacher Thuraya al-Hafez, who sat in Shishakli’s 1953 Parliament. Even after his overthrow, Syrians were for years in awe of his rule.
The Assad regime maintains the aura of stability, modernity, and progressive attitude towards women over the territories it controls. Despite being part of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, Assad’s regime still embraces secularism to generate support from Syria’s religious minorities and those who wish to keep Sunni Islamists from dominating the public sphere.
Regional and geopolitical trends
Regional and geopolitical trends
“Syria is the current official name for that country which lies within the artificial frontiers drawn up by imperialism.” The famous quote from Shishakli from 1953 still holds a measure of truth.
Syria’s borders have constantly been subjected to bouts of internal secessionism or tested by neighboring states. Historical examples include the Golan Heights, Hatay, and most recently, Rojova. Analysts often speak of creating an Alawite state. Just as internal political and ethnic rivalries fostered instability, so did the region’s geopolitics, which during Shishakli’s time was primarily a contest of dominance between Iraq and its British-backed Hashemite rulers, and the Egyptian-Saudi alliance. For the West, Syria was viewed through the prism of the Cold War and the battle against Communism. France continued to vie for influence in its former colonial dominion in order to check the British.
Aside from his coup and military rule, Shishakli was known for preserving Syria’s independence and sovereignty during a period of heightened Western influence in the region. He shunned military aid from the Eisenhower Administration and but also kept Syria from falling into the Soviet Bloc. The Fertile Crescent Project (sometimes referred to as the Baghdad Pact) was the primary driver of the region’s geopolitical trends during his time. The British sphere of influence extended over Iraq and though there was a desire to erase the artificial borders, the potential threat of Western interference led the nationalist forces inside Syria to keep prospects of a union between Damascus and Baghdad at bay.
Syrians are fiercely protective against potential foreign interference, real or perceived. For Assad, the role of safe guarding Syria’s independence from foreign influence remains a primary factor in resisting the negotiations in Geneva and the notion of a political transition. Assad’s recent anti-Western comments outside Daraya mosque further demonstrates this resistance. The heavily reliance on Russia and Iran is regarded by Assad’s supporters as a genuine friendship and it is not yet known how their increased influence will impact Syria for the remaining duration of the war.
Shishakli was able to court Egypt and Saudi Arabia and allowed France to maintain a level of nominal influence inside of the country. Just as Assad has leveraged Russia and Iran, Shishakli knew how to utilize the region’s players to keep Syria neutral during the Cold War and safeguard its independence. Iraq was a key instrument in fomenting internal dissent and organizing the forces that ultimately united against him.
It is easy to see how Syria’s central government historically wrestled with control over various regions. Towards the end of his rule, Homs was the key center of anti-Shishakli activity. However, he perceived the Druze as a threat to his regime. Shishakli was perhaps most notorious for his efforts to curtail the tribal-based power of the Druze located in southern Syria. The Druze never forgave him for the shelling and military assault on Jabal Druze (Druze Mountain) and many Druze officers in the Syrian army later formed the backbone of the coalition (supported by the Iraqi government) that conspired against him.
Today, regional agitation plays out in all parts of Syria. Aleppo remains the central stronghold for anti-Assad Arab rebel activity. In addition, the Baath Party’s years of brutal Arabization policies towards the Kurds in northeastern Syria present a similar case. The Kurds and the Assad loyalists have frequently clashed in the city of Hasakah. A central component of the Islamic State’s strategy to recruit Sunnis and hijack anti-Assad sentiment of the Syrian rebellion was the border destroying ideology of its so-called caliphate.
Whether consolidating power over Syria from Damascus or Raqqa, figurehead leaders have relied on a strategy of projecting the image of strength and an absolutist position to maintain the state’s sovereignty over the country. As it was difficult to enforce during Shishakli’s time, it is overwhelmingly obvious for Assad. If Syria is to remain united, the same will hold true for whoever follows him
Shishakli, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Arab Liberation Movement
Secular and progressive, the SSNP enjoyed the height of its popularity during Shishakli’s Syria. It wasn’t until after Shishakli’s overthrow that the SSNP’s political fortunes took a turn for the worse. Lebanon acted as a hideout for political exiles, such as the Baath Party ideologue Michael Aflaq, who returned to Syria to enact revenge on the SSNP after Shishakli’s downfall. After the 1955 assassination of the widely popular Baath Party member and army Deputy Chief of Staff Malki, the SSNP was blacklisted and effectively driven underground by the rising Baath.
Shishakli entertained the SSNP during the first year of his rule. However, he eventually abstained from fully embracing the party’s central tenant of Pan-Syrianism in favor of the more vastly popular Pan-Arabism. He founded his own party, the Arab Liberation Movement (ALM) to cultivate this trend.
While there are no ideological ties between the SSNP and ALM, there is a strong influence of the first over the latter in terms of party structure, salute, hierarchy of power, etc. The ALM worked to embrace pan-Arabism whereas the SSNP emphasized its concoction of nationalism, mythicism and pan-Syrianism. Both of these parties, along with the Baath and Communist Party, were progressive in nature, allowing women and Syrians regardless of sect to join.
As for the Arab Liberation Movement, it has disappeared completely. In 1954, President Hashem al-Atasi, picking up the pieces after Shishakli’s departure, choose not ban the former dictator’s party, and even allowed the ALM secretary Maamoun al-Kuzbari to run for parliament (and obtain a seat). The ALM eventually died out with the start of the Syrian-Egyptian Union.
The ALM was ultimately unable to survive without Shishakli. A few hidden reminders of the ALM remain in plain sight. There is a major square in Damascus, when entering the Christian sectors, called “Sahet al-Tahrir” which was actually named after the Arab Liberation Movement (Freedom or Liberation in Arabic is Tahrir, noted in the name of the party, Haraket al-Tahrir al-Arabi).
Al-Kuzbari (who later became Prime Minister) was allowed to be buried in Damascus when he died in 1998 and was given a semi-official funeral. As of 2016, his picture hangs in the main hall of Syrian Parliament to honor his role as the speaker of Parliament during the Shishakli era.
The SSNP suffered both persecution and a popular decline in Lebanon and Syria until the late 1960s, when many of the SSNP leaders were freed from Lebanese prisons and began to rebuild the party during the 70s and 80s. It was during the Lebanese Civil War, that the party tentatively tested a friendship with Hafez al-Assad. This friendship later paid off. The SSNP has not only survived but has seen a resurgenceduring the Syrian Civil War.
The Baath have always held a distain for Shishakli, regarding him as a foreign stooge. There are no references to Shishakli in the SSNP’s party literature, since it would antagonize Syrian Druze and the Baathists, the latter are their political allies and who the SSNP are backing in the civil war.
The SSNP’s older generation still speaks very fondly of Shishakli, but always in private. “Party President Issam al-Mahayri stepped down in late 2015 and was a good friend of Shishakli. When giving a four-part interview to the semi-official Al-Dunia TV channel in 2010, al-Mahayri spoke positively of Shishakli and his words were aired on state TV uncensored,” said Sami Moubayed, the founder of the Damascus History Foundation.
The SSNP’s leadership is proud of the fact that he and his brother Salah were early members of the party, along with Akram al-Hawrani, who later became a key member of the Baath Party. However, Shishakli was never instrumental as an ideological figure in the party and his influence is more nostalgic than anything else. Shishakli is thus still celebrated by the SSNP as a VIP member without ideological the inspiration.
Despite this, should the Assad regime win, the SSNP may play a greater role in post-war Syria as a vehicle for fostering a renewed notion of national unity. With so much harm coming from Syria’s Arab neighbors, the Baath’s concept of pan-Arabism might truly be dead. If the SSNP increases their political influence, Shishakli could perhaps become rehabilitated in the public discourse.
Shishakli’s downfall in 1954 and his legacy in Syria
Shishakli began to scale back the role of the military in Syria’s political scene in an effort to legitimize his rule. Many well-connected officers who suddenly felt detached and disenfranchised turned to Shishakli’s political enemies. With the help of Iraq, factions of the army were able to present a united front to subsequently oust him from Damascus. Once the Baath came to power, they worked to erase his existence from Syria’s collective memory. For many years, the ruling party worked to erase him from Syrian history. In private, he is still regarded and respected as a prominent and transformative Syrian leader.
Shishakli began to scale back the role of the military in Syria’s political scene in an effort to legitimize his rule. Many well-connected officers who suddenly felt detached and disenfranchised turned to Shishakli’s political enemies. With the help of Iraq, factions of the army were able to present a united front to subsequently oust him from Damascus. Once the Baath came to power, they worked to erase his existence from Syria’s collective memory. For many years, the ruling party worked to erase him from Syrian history. In private, he is still regarded and respected as a prominent and transformative Syrian leader.
“There is no mention of Shishakli in school books, at any level, and he is never mentioned on Syrian TV with the one exception of a television series called Hammam Al Qishani produced during the 1990s, where a Syrian actor, Ussama Roumani, played his role. Only one book was published in Syria about Shishakli since his resignation in 1954, and it was a mediocre one that failed to do him any justice,” explained Moubayed.
In Damascus, there is not a single monument or a plaque bearing his name. Even the official history of the Presidential Palace that Shishakli constructed at the tip of Abu Rummaneh Boulevard (now office of Vice-President Najah al-Attar) is obscured. The palace is usually associated with Nasser, who addressed Syria from its balcony in 1958 to herald in the country’s ill-fated union with Egypt.
Shishakli never returned to the presidency in Syria after leaving office in February 1954. Though there are two examples of when Shishakli had planned to return to power. First, it was revealed that immediately after his departure he tried to reroute the plane to Beirut when his supporters urged him to return. This effort, however, was stymied by the U.S. State Department and his plane was denied a landing permit at the Beirut International Airport.
The second event was a few years later when the SSNP facilitated several rounds of secret meetings in Beirut with Shishakli, his brother Salah, and a group of coup-plotters. However, Shishakli, a military man through and through, knew that the plot did not have the support of the Syrian army and decided against participating. Should Assad eventually decide to seek exile in Russia, it is possible that following years of political turbulence and terrorism, he could orchestrate his own return to power. To enact such a maneuver would be dependent on the level of support both in and outside of Syria.
The elections that followed Shishakli’s four years of dictatorship brought about the short-lived union with Egypt, a union that’s end brought about years of political squabbles. This was compounded by the breakdown of the army, which became factionalized and rudderless without Shishakli. An array of officers organized and formed their own secret networks of political patrons. An alliance of mutual interests between Aflaq’s Baath Party and the Syrian Communists ushered in a new era of authoritarian rule that led to the Neo-Baathist coup of 1966 and ultimately the Assad family’s current dynasty.
When considering Shishakli and his time, it is important to recall that when confronted with the news of rebellion, he could have resorted to the use of force (he did, after all, still control loyal factions of the military including heavy armor divisions) but abdicated in favor of self-imposed exile and avoided certain civil war. It is possible he knew that Syria, with its fragile political foundations and regional rivalries, would be at risk for long term turmoil. This very fear that Shishakli sought to avoid continues to play out in full earnest today.
For Syrians who remember him, Shishakli was a divisive leader, either regarded as transformative and progressive or despised as a dictator. His eventual assassination in Ceres, Brazil, coupled with the many years of rule by the Baath helped to cement the shroud over the memories of his existence. As the Syrian independence flag once again flutters in a period of uncertainty, it recalls the history of Shishakli and Syria’s forgotten past.
- Christopher Solomon is an analyst with Global Risk Insights. Chris traveled to Lebanon and Syria in 2004 with the CONNECT program at the University of Balamand. He earned his MA from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at the University of Pittsburgh. He also interned at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC.
from-joshualandis...
Girls scouts parading in front of the Presidential Palace in Damascus (Abu Rummaneh Street) in 1954. President Adib al-Shishakli is standing on his office balcony. This palace was constructed and first used by Shishakli in the early 1950s, before rising to fame as the place where President Gamal Abd al-Nasser appeared in 1958 to declare the merger of Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR).
SSNP leader Issam al-Mahayri in Parliament (right with glasses).
ALM rally in 1953. The sign reads the party’s name, Haraket al-Tahrir al-Arabi.
HISTORICAL STUDIES
The Beginnings of Authoritarian Culture in the Arab World
The Persistence and Resilience of Undemocratic Government in Syria
By Kevin W Martin · Published 2017
The al-Shiskakli regime's appropriation of American political culture, exemplified in the above caricature, which accompanied the state-sponsored article "Luminous Pages from the Life of a Leader," was instrumental in creating and sustaining the dictator's leader cult.
s recent events have demonstrated, one of the most significant phenomena of the Arab World’s modern history is the persistence and resilience of undemocratic government. Syria has enjoyed the dubious distinction of leadership in this respect, its experience foreshadowing and/or exemplifying that of its neighbors. The pattern was established in 1949, when Syria experienced three coups d’état that installed a succession of military rulers. All of these coups were planned and executed by Army Colonel Adib al-Shishakli, who today is largely forgotten in Syria, and remains an obscure figure to all but a narrow circle of historians and political scientists outside the country. This is a considerable oversight, for after seizing power on his own behalf in December 1949, al-Shishakli effectively ruled Syria for much of the next five years, during which he wrought long-term changes in Syria’s political culture and initiated a host of policies and practices subsequently adopted by Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and other authoritarian rulers throughout the region.
Al-Shishakli aggressively pursued an ambitious program of national development that aimed to transform Syria’s political economy, governmental structure, and social relations. The resulting populist, corporatist, and authoritarian institutions and practices provided a legacy of undemocratic precedents as well as the institutional framework for the Ba‘th Party and Hafez al-Assad’s implementation of yet more transformative measures in the 1960s and 1970s.
More significantly, al-Shishakli’s efforts to reorder Syrian political life included the abolition of existing political parties, and their replacement with a Pan-Arabist mass-mobilization organization, the Harakat Tahrir al-‘Arabi (Arab Liberation Movement). Focused on his person, this organization, along with a vastly expanded system of state-supervised print and broadcast media, was instrumental to the articulation of an authoritarian, state-guided public culture that was unprecedented in the Arab world. The most distinctive feature of this new public culture was al-Shishakli’s cult of personality, an innovation that would have dire consequences for the future politics of Syria and the region.
Although this experiment occurred three decades prior to the appearance of Hafez al-Assad’s personality cult, scholars have routinely characterized the latter as an unprecedented phenomenon in Syrian history. The scholarly consensus also presumes that the “leader cults” of post-WWII Marxist dictators—Stalin, Mao, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Enver Hoxha, and Kim Il-Sung—provided the only possible precursors for the elaborate leader cults of Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. In fact, al-Shishakli’s cult provided the most obvious model for Assad’s, which mimicked its predecessor in a number of significant ways.
Furthermore, the genealogy of modern personality cults is more complex and varied than conventionally assumed. The personal histories and interests of al-Shishakli’s advisers and cult architects suggest a source of inspiration remote from the practices of Socialist regimes. All of the available evidence indicates that the cult was informed, at least in part, by the practices of American business and political culture. In keeping with the principles formulated by founding theorist of public relations Edward Bernays, al-Shishakli’s advisers used his expanded apparatus of propaganda and persuasion to identify, exaggerate, or invent threats, enemies, “lacks,” “absences,” or problematic social conditions. Then they presented the “remedies” for these ills; the protection provided by al-Shishakli’s leadership and his command of Syria’s expanded and valorized armed forces, police, and security services.
Adib al-Shishakli was a veteran of the French Mandate-era gendamerie, the post-independence Syrian Armed Forces, and al-Jaysh al-Inqadh al-‘Arabi (The Arab Salvation Army), a multinational force created to combat Zionist paramilitaries in Palestine. Embittered by this last experience, al-Shishakli became convinced that the Arabs’ humiliating defeat was attributable to the indifference, incompetence, and corruption of the Arab states’ civilian politicians. This explains his role as the key actor in all five of Syria’s post-independence military coups. In 1949, al-Shishakli commanded the forces that overthrew Syria’s civilian government, the regime of General Husni al-Za‘im, and that of al-Za ‘im’s successor, General Sami al-Hinnawi. Al-Shishakli characterized this last intervention as a “correction” of al-Hinnawi’s posture favoring union with the British-allied Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad. Twenty-one years later, Hafez al-Assad would use the same term to describe his coup against his “excessively” Leftist comrades in the Military Committee of the Ba‘th Party.
Upon assuming control of Syria’s government, al-Shishakli proposed a developmental program that encompassed the revision of Syria’s civil and criminal codes, restructuring the system of land tenure, reformulating relationships between capital and labor, the founding of a national bank, expanded access to all levels of education, universal conscription, women’s suffrage, a progressive tax code, the forced settlement of pastoralists, and a host of other measures designed to stimulate agricultural and industrial production, raise the living standards of peasants and workers, and increase state revenue. As many of these initiatives were inimical to the interests of Syria’s entrenched political and economic elites, they could not be realized through conventional modes of politics.
Thus in November 1951, al-Shishakli overthrew the civilian figurehead government he had previously installed, dismissed its cabinet, dissolved parliament, banned most political parties, abolished the Supreme Court, suppressed influential newspapers, prohibited students, teachers, government employees, and trade unionists from engaging in political activity, and compelled schoolmasters, university professors, and the senior ranks of the civil and foreign services to take an oath of loyalty to his regime and person. Many of these measures would be reinstated by the series of Nasserist and Ba‘thist regimes that subsequently ruled Syria.
Al-Shishakli then appointed a trusted surrogate as president, prime minister, and army chief of staff, while retaining for himself the office of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces. Freed from civilian interference, al-Shishakli retrained, reequipped, and expanded Syria’s armed forces, police, and security services, and executed politically motivated purges of these institutions, as well as the civil service, the judiciary, and most government ministries.
In addition, he focused considerable energy on the social and cultural spheres, where his regime’s initiatives displayed an equal measure of statist, secularist, and xenophobic tendencies. As al-Shishakli attributed the influence of religious and ethnic minorities to French Mandate policies of “divide and rule,” he now strictly regulated public speaking by leaders of minority sects, required that Muslims have equal representation on all bodies governing non-Muslim organizations, forbade the use of “foreign” names for places of lodging and entertainment, and mandated that all public events be conducted exclusively in Arabic. In addition, al-Shishakli ordered instructors at the Homs Military Academy to institute a quota system minimizing the number of minorities (i.e., those who were not both Sunni Muslim and Arab) graduating from the institution, and dissolved the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other decrees targeted practices and privileges long enjoyed by members of all faiths: publicly wearing garments identified with specific religious beliefs and practices was now subject to regulations, and the requirement of religious education was eliminated from the curricula of public schools.
Al-Shishakli displayed comparable ambitions in the economic sphere, pursuing classic “import substitution,” corporatist, and infrastructural expansion policies with vigor. His distrust of Syria’s traditional political elites prompted a turn to Damascus’s emergent industrial bourgeoisie. Al-Shishakli enacted protectionist policies and restrictions on organized labor that encouraged these proto-industrialist entrepreneurs to merge their companies into monopolistic enterprises and invest the accumulated capital in constructing factories in newly established industrial zones, thereby making them partners in his efforts to construct an autarkic economic regime.
In early 1953, al-Shishakli discarded all lingering pretense by dismissing his appointed “President and Prime Minister” Fawzi Selu. He then promulgated a new constitution, which provided for the direct election of a president wielding executive power over a newly constituted Chamber of Deputies and all other state institutions. On July 10, 1953, in an ominous portent of Syria’s subsequent history, a plebiscite approved the new constitution and “elected” sole candidate Adib al-Shishakli as President of the Syrian Republic by a reported 99% of the vote. Between 1971 and 2000, Hafez al-Assad was repeatedly “elected” president by identical means and with similar margins.
The primary agent of al-Shishakli’s authoritarian public culture was the new Syrian Broadcasting Service, which supervised the rapid centralization, expansion, and technological enhancement of radio programming and broadcasting. With this instrument, the dictator initiated the region’s era of media wars, castigating domestic opponents and the rulers of neighboring states during live broadcasts. Equally important was an increase in the number and variety of state-owned periodicals echoing the regime’s narrative. Crucial in this regard were the magazines al-Idha‘a al-Suriyya (Syrian Broadcasting), and Majallat al-Shurta wa al-Amn al-‘Amm (The Journal of the Police and Public Security). Despite the latter journal’s title, it was conceived and marketed as a mass-circulation publication covering news, sports, and entertainment. Yet, most of the journal’s content explicitly conformed to al-Shishakli’s authoritarian program, including regular features exhorting “moral” and “orderly” behavior, celebrating the police and security personnel’s bravery, professionalism, and benevolence, and expressing gratitude for al-Shishakli’s principled and selfless leadership.
The earliest issues of The Journal of the Police and Public Security included articles by senior security personnel explaining new measures aimed at the regimentation of social life. One example declared that, in order to prevent “improper behavior not in keeping with Syria’s progress,” new regulations required employees of hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, theaters, and cinemas to register with the police, receive instruction in the craft of identifying “anti-social” types, and wear specially designed uniforms appropriate to their rank and place of employment. Early issues of the journal also featured excerpts from speeches in which al-Shishakli emphasized the essential role of security service personnel in Syria’s survival and development.
Yet al-Shishakli was sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend that the knowledge and skills necessary for the professional management of his infrastructure of propaganda and persuasion would not be found in the armed forces or security services. Thus, he turned to those with various forms of modern expertise: academics, technicians, bureaucrats, and most importantly, experienced journalists and polemicists.
One of these experts, Fu’ad Shabat, Professor of Law at the Syrian University, and Secretary General of the Interior Ministry, published the article “The Taming of Freedom in Our Times.” After a lengthy excursus on the various forms of individual and collective freedom known throughout human history, Shabat declared that, “freedom is important, but it must be regulated in order to elevate men above the level of the jungle.”
Another expert expressing such views was Fu’ad al-Shayeb, an experienced journalist, radio correspondent, and government bureaucrat. Al-Shayeb played a crucial early role in raising al-Shishakli’s media profile, persuading the dictator to emulate United States President Franklin Roosevelt’s practice of making evening radio addresses in an intimate, conversational style. In fact, the hiring of journalists as close advisers, the expansion of press and information offices in government ministries, and many of al-Shishakli’s other innovations in the fields of media and public relations closely echoed FDR’s New Deal- and WWII-era efforts.
But al-Shishakli’s inner circle included others who were proficient in English and avid followers of American politics and media. The most significant of these figures were Ahmad ‘Isseh, Qadri al-Qal‘aji, and Nazih al-Hakim, who enjoyed unparalleled access to and influence over al-Shishakli. Ahmad ‘Isseh had more than fifteen years’ experience as a journalist, editor, and publisher, including a stint as UPI correspondent in Damascus, when al-Shishakli named him Director General of Syrian Broadcasting in 1953. Qadri al-Qal‘aji had comparable experience as a journalist, editor, and publisher in Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon. In 1952, he became the director of al-Shishakli’s press office, and subsequently as his Private Secretary. Attorney and former press officer of the Syrian diplomatic service Nazih al-Hakim served as the dictator’s public relations adviser. When al-Shishakli decided to assume the presidency, al-Hakim supervised a media campaign that included placing massive posters bearing the leader’s image in public places and distributing untold numbers of similar photographs to schools, government offices, mosques, and businesses, an obvious harbinger of the Assad regime’s more comprehensive efforts two decades later.
Finally, during the period of al-Shishakli’s first three coups, he received the advice of yet another practitioner of “engineering” public opinion a la Madison Avenue, CIA agent Miles Copeland. Stationed in Damascus from 1947 to 1950, Copeland immediately cultivated a close relationship with al-Shishakli. In this and in subsequent assignments, Copeland gradually refined his professional specialization, employing the tools of advertising, public relations, management consulting, and psychological warfare to promote and sustain leaders perceived as “pro-American,” i.e., anti-communist.
As he prepared to assume the presidency, al-Shishakli announced the formation of the Arab Liberation Movement, the institutional expression of his vision for a corporatist, single party, and authoritarian state. Employing quasi-fascist rituals, ALM rallies engendered countless radio broadcasts, journal and newspaper articles, photographs, and newsreels. For example, the Journal of the Police and Public Security described a June 1953 rally in Damascus as a “glorious festival” at which al-Shishakli’s arrival prompted “the applause of hundreds of thousands” who had “flocked to the capital from all corners of the country,” and whose “throats echoed chants about the deeds of Syria’s national hero and savior who gave them lives of freedom and happiness.”[i] A portion of al-Shishakli’s speech was repeated by the crowd, swearing “allegiance to the leader,” “his principles,” and “his Arabist goals.”[ii] Media accounts of these orchestrated events, which asserted the voluntary participation of Syrians from all walks of life, clearly foreshadowed those produced on a grander scale after Hafez al-Assad’s seizure of power.
This media campaign was overseen by Qadri al-Qal‘aji and Nazih al-Hakim, via yet another new institution, the Directorate General of Propaganda and National Guidance. This ingenuously named body distributed illustrated booklets featuring edited transcripts of al-Shishakli’s radio addresses to schools, libraries, bookstores, military installations, and government offices, and published adulatory essays accompanying these transcripts. A typical example of the latter, Qadri al-Qal‘aji’s “Adib al-Shishakli: The Life of a Nationalist Hero,” appeared in Syrian Broadcasting. After recounting familiar tales of the leader’s principled and courageous resistance to French tyranny and Zionist aggression, al-Qal‘aji praised the “true apostle of Arabism” for overthrowing Syria’s elected government, an act he characterized as a “national necessity” at “this critical juncture in the history of our homeland.”[iii]
Similarly, the inaugural issue of The Journal of the Police and Public Security featured Director General of Police and Public Security Ibrahim al-Husseini’s offering of thanks to God, the apostles, and the prophets for the divine favor bestowed upon Syria as it was guided “into its blessed renaissance” by the “leader-hero…bearing a torch to light the way.”[iv] By alluding to the ALM’s symbol—a flaming torch held aloft—al-Husseini was deploying a principal metaphor in the leader cult’s discourse. The torch and the leader’s “voice” were symbols of agency, employed throughout this discourse to portray al-Shishakli’s leadership as the force endowing the people of Syria and the Arab world with the capacity to see and speak amidst the gloom and silence produced by foreign oppression.
Adib al-Shishakli’s personality cult reached its apogee with the publication of issue #7 of The Journal of the Police and Public Security. Labeled the “leader issue,” its contents were summarized as “noble aspects of the life of the hero who saved the country from chaos and provided hope for a free and happy life.” Al-Shishakli was lauded as a “servant of the nation,” a “warrior and conciliator,” the “wise architect of the Arab Renaissance,” the “virtuous helmsman” of Arabism, the “man who rescued the people from political chaos,” and the “leader-commander-warrior-struggler” responsible for “introducing a new order” in Syria.”[v]
In the same issue, Hind al-Qawwas, a prominent member of the ALM, contributed a lengthy and adulatory assessment of al-Shishakli’s live radio broadcast explaining the major provisions of his draft constitution. According to al-Qawwas, the document would “restore” women’s “usurped rights” and eliminate “forms of repression” that had “inscribed shame upon the brow” of Syria.
I sat listening to the national hero with admiration…his deep voice undulating with warm national feeling. We who had an opportunity to witness this historic event experienced reverence and awe, and could hardly believe our eyes…the great man was crying…as the leader quietly departed the studio…his sacred teardrops bathed and healed the wounds that imperialism, colonialism, and the disaster of Palestine made in our hearts.[vi]
Yet the most hyperbolic expression of al-Shishakli’s cult was provided by Qadri al-Qal‘aji, whose paean—“Luminous Pages from the Life of a Leader”—was accompanied by a caricature of al-Shishakli as the Statue of Liberty.[vii] This neat confluence of the ALM’s logo—the flaming torch—and the cult’s frequent, uncritical embrace of the visual language of American exceptionalism verges on kitsch. In this respect, the “aesthetics” of al-Shishakli’s cult once again foreshadowed the patent absurdity of the Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein cults.
In February 1954, an army rebellion led by many of the young officers al-Shishakli had favored with promotion compelled the dictator to flee Syria. These officers, in cooperation with prominent members of the old political elite, rapidly abrogated critical elements of al-Shsihakli’s governing system. Within days of al-Shishakli’s departure, most of his senior government appointees and his close advisers and associates were dismissed from office, and many accompanied the dictator into exile.
Yet virtually all of the institutions of coercion and persuasion al-Shishakli had founded were retained and/or enhanced. This included the journals dedicated to his personality cult. The new General Manager of The Journal of Police and Public Security, attorney and senior civil servant Ihsan al-Qawwas, soon announced that, in response to “readers’ desire,” the journal’s name had been changed to Sawt Suriya (The Voice of Syria). Yet, al-Qawwas’s editorial emphasized continuity rather than change. The Voice of Syria would, he pledged, “continue to fulfill the magazine’s mission, achieve its objectives…proclaim Syria’s true message to the outside world, and combat the propaganda organized by its enemies in foreign countries.” Thus, he expressed the hope that readers would “continue to think of this as their magazine, and feel that it was and will continue to be the voice of Syria, beloved Syria, emerging republic, and the true homeland of the Arabs, Arabism, and of the most glorious renaissance recorded in history.”[viii]
In fact, other than the glaring absence of al-Shishakli, the journal’s content displayed no discernable change. The same sports, entertainment, and Police Gazette-style crime features continued to appear, as did pictorials commemorating the sacrifice of police and security service personnel and warnings about the ever-present threat of Zionism and other sinister, “alien” forces. In fact, in this and other venues, the use of Madison Avenue-style techniques to stimulate anxiety, deployed so ably by al-Shishakli’s team of media experts, continued unabated.
Furthermore, a flaming torch, the symbol of al-Shishakli’s Arab Liberation Movement, and a constant feature of his regime’s iconography and discourse, was now adopted as the journal’s logo. This symbolic appropriation, along with the Orwellian choice of title to designate a journal published by the security services, signifies the ironic nature of Adib al-Shishakli’s legacy: Syria, long deprived of the capacity to “speak” in international affairs, would now be “heard” through the pronouncements of its Public Security Police. And despite Syria’s immediate nominal return to the status quo ante al-Shishakli, the dictator’s regime had wrought seemingly irreversible changes in the country’s political culture. The armed forces and security services refused to relinquish their influence on successive governments. And the army’s experience of executing al-Shishakli’s coups, enabling his dictatorship, and then overthrowing him in collusion with his enemies, transformed the institution into an inherently political entity that would, largely through its own internecine conflicts, perpetuate and exacerbate Syria’s instability over the following decade.
After a failed attempt (with U.S. assistance) to return to power in 1957, Adib al-Shishakli receded into obscurity in Brazil, where he was assassinated in September 1964. Yet, the most distinctive element of al-Shishakli’s system, the leader cult, would linger in official memory, only to reappear in grotesquely exaggerated form decades later.
Kevin W. Martin is Willis F. Doney Member in the School of Historical Studies. He is exploring the reach of American “soft power” by analyzing Syrians’ exposure to and perceptions of public diplomacy, propaganda, films, advertising, and new modes of urban leisure. Drawing upon an array of Syrian and American sources, he is also analyzing cold war cultural exchange.
Published in The Institute Letter Spring 2018
